

From Developmentalism to Maturity: Japan's Civil Society Organizations in Comparative Perspective

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Introduction

The size and quality of civil society organizations are key measures of a democracy's health. Associational life in any country can be approached theoretically from three different angles: from the viewpoints of the state, of society, and of the groups themselves. I empirically operationalize these three viewpoints using the indices of state-recognized institutions, social establishments, and active groups (Tsujinaka 2002: 230-50). The state always tries to mold and influence civil society organizations to its liking by means of state-recognized institutions. Society provides such organizations with the resources to hire employees and establish offices. Regardless of institutions and establishments, citizens in practice form groups, communicate with other groups, and lobby for public policies. Analyzing the role of civil society organizations within a democracy requires this three-pronged approach if it is to comprehend fully the holistic nature of associational life.

Portraying Japanese civil society in this manner has been problematic since the dawn of modern Japan. As Frank Schwartz suggests in the introduction to this volume, Japan's civil society has been analyzed from two contrasting perspectives. First, the institutional-statist perspective emphasizes the relatively strict regulatory environment created either by a strong, interventionist state (Wolferen 1989; Sugimoto 1997) or, conversely, by a socially penetrative public administration that requires maximum mobilization of social organizations to compensate for its weak jurisdictional power (Muramatsu 1994). According to this perspective, which focuses on institutions such as public-interest corporations (*koeki hojin*), (mainly public) institutions play an important role in regulating civil society organizations. Studies by Lester Salamon and Helmut Anheier (1994, 1997)¹ that compared the

¹ Salamon's group projects in 1994 and 1998 compared the economic strength of the nonprofit sector in seven European countries. In terms of the financial size of this sector, Japan (2.5 percent share of

nonprofit sectors of twelve countries appear to take this perspective because of their reliance on governmental data. From this perspective, Japan's civil society is relatively small and under rigid state control.

Second, the social-pluralist perspective focuses on emerging citizen activities and movements by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and nonprofit organizations (NPOs) since the late 1980s (Yamamoto 1995; Dentsii S6ken 1996; Yamamoto et al. 1998; Nakamura and Nihon NPO Sentaa 1999). A kind of "NGO-NPO boom" and "volunteer revolution" was clearly observable in the 1990s (Houma and Deguchi. 1996), at least in terms of media and scholarly coverage (Tsujiinaka 2002: 30-34). This trend culminated in the passing of the Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities (1998 Law No.7, or the NPO Law).

A social-modernization perspective that regards as natural the differentiation of societies supports the pluralist perspective: the number of interest groups, voluntary citizen groups, and other citizen-initiated social actors is thought to be directly proportional to a society's level of modernity, industrialization, and affluence (see Dahl 1991 and Huntington 1991). When viewing Japanese civil society from this perspective, it appears to be very mature, active, and pluralistic. Japan has boasted the second largest economy in the world since the 1970s and has embraced liberal democracy for more than half a century.

The path to modernization has not been completely linear: there have been several booms and waves of vitalization among civil society organizations in Japan. Corresponding to Samuel Huntington's (1991) three waves of democratization in the world's nation-states, these periods within Japan roughly correspond to Taish6 democracy of the 1920s, the postwar Occupation democracy of 1945 to 1950, and the progressive municipality and citizen movements of the 1970s. The recent NGO-NPO boom of the 1990s may represent a fourth wave. Despite, or because of, the existence of these wave-like periods every twenty-five years, evaluations of Japan's civil society tend to be ambiguous and ambivalent, as are evaluations of Japan's democracy.

Clearly related to the independent foci of the institutional-statist and social-pluralist models are two vectors that are driving Japan's civil society in different directions: interventionist state control and spontaneous social drives. My main concern is how to comprehend their points of convergence empirically and comparatively and to evaluate the resulting equilibrium. To that end, my purpose here is to objectively measure and structurally characterize the organizational aspects of Japan's civil society at the turn of the twenty-first century in comparative perspective by examining the United States and South Korea as well as Japan.² To follow

GDP ranks fifth between Germany and Italy and is slightly below the average of 3.4 percent. Japan recorded a higher than average proportion in four of eleven subcategories, however. This study highlighted the unsolved problem of how adequately to compare societies with different cultures and historical patterns, so differences should not be exaggerated in the fashion of some statist authors.

² To overcome the problem of cross-cultural applicability of the concept of civil society (see Schwartz's introduction to this volume), we must compare Japan with other non-Western, industrialized societies. Here, the comparison with Korea serves that purpose.

the definition of civil society proposed by Schwartz in this volume, my objective is to delineate those intermediaries³ located between the state and individuals or families that seek neither profit within the market nor power within the state.

I mainly base my observations and analyses on three empirical sources:

1. State-recognized institutions. I use statistics found in government directories for such institutions as associations, foundations, cooperatives, unions, NGOs, and NPOs. This material covers approximately 420,000 formally incorporated entities existing in Japan's nonprofit sector in the mid-1990s.
2. Social establishments. This refers to that category entitled "membership organizations" (Korea and the United States) and "political-economic-cultural associations" (Japan) in establishment censuses and related statistics provided by the respective governments. This category covers a narrower range of intermediaries (fewer than 40,000 associations, clubs, unions, and so on) that serves as the core of sociopolitical activities in Japan.
3. Active groups. My comprehensive Japan Interest Group Survey (JIGS) project conducted a cross-national survey of civil society organizations and interest groups in the latter part of the 1990s (Japan and Korea in 1997 and the United States in 1999) using telephone directories as population samples.⁴ The most recent (2000) Japanese directory contains the category "unions and associations," which includes approximately 200,000 groups. This category offers coverage intermediate between the other two, enumerating active groups that have telephones to communicate with other actors.

Ranging from business associations to purely ideological advocacy organizations and from established think-tanks with many professional members to voluntary neighborhood groups without any staff, my definition and its operationalization as described above may entail one of this volume's most inclusive approaches to Japan's civil society. In addition, this chapter discusses the present situation, history, and structural nature of Japan's civil society organizations in comparison with those of Korea and the United States. Without this kind of systematic and

³ According to Kasza (1995), these intermediaries are not always civic. According to his analysis, there are many administered mass organizations that work for and under authoritarian or state corporatist regimes.

⁴ For further information regarding these surveys, see Tsujinaka 2002 and the codebooks contained in Tsujinaka 1999a, 1999b, 2001a, and 2001b. In a word, based on random sampling of commercial telephone directories, the survey had a sample size of approximately 4,000 to 5,000 in each country. It was conducted by mail. Differences in response rates may have affected the survey results. The highest response rate was attained in Japan (38.5 percent), followed by the United States (34.3 percent), and finally Korea (12.4 percent). The Korean data may thus represent groups that are more active and elitist than those in Japan or the United States. The author conducted similar surveys in Germany (2000) and China (2002).

structural comparison of a wide range of organizations, any debate concerning statist versus pluralist aspects of civil society would be fruitless. Because civil society organizations are not easily isolated from the state and society at large, it is very difficult to distinguish which organizations are "civil." A phenomenon such as civil society must be examined within its cultural and historical context. Therefore, it is crucial to compare Japan with other non-Western and Western societies.

The Present Configuration of Civil Society Organizations in Japan

As noted above, the present configuration of civil society organizations in Japan can be approached from the three different angles of state, society, and groups. Empirically, I examine state-recognized institutions, social establishments, and active groups.

The State and Civil Society Organizations: An Institutional Perspective

Robert Pekkanen (2000a: 77) lays out the institutional-statist understanding of the relationship between the state and civil society in Japan as follows:

Japan has managed its civil society organizations with one of the most severe regulatory environments in the developed world. Japanese law stipulates that such groups can acquire legal status only through the explicit permission of the competent bureaucratic authority, and grants this authority continuing powers of supervision and administrative guidance. This combination of a discretionary screening function, close supervision of operations, and sanctioning power has compromised the vitality of the civil society and NPO sector in Japan. Moreover, the legal blind spots have impaired the legitimacy of many groups and the sector as a whole.

In addition to the relative strictness of the Japanese regulatory environment, he (ibid.: 76) also refers to "the comparative immobility in the pattern in Japanese regulation."

The statist, represented here by Pekkanen and Salamon and Anheier (1994, 1997), tend to focus narrowly on the system of public-interest corporations (see Sasaki 1992 and Hayashi 1997 for a comprehensive and analytical profile of these corporations), which is based on the Japanese Civil Code. Pekkanen (2000a: 77) sharply contrasts Japan and the United States, noting that "under Japan's Civil Code system, only 26,089 groups gained legal status as nonprofit 'public interest legal persons,' versus the 1,140,000 American groups to which the IRS has granted nonprofit status."

Given these figures, the ratio of American to Japanese groups appears to be 44:1. As Pekkanen (2000a: 100) himself observes, however, there are more than 130 varieties of public-interest corporation based on ninety special laws (Minkan Kōeki Sekutai Kenkyūkai 1997: 21-22). In Japan in the mid-1990s, the total number of

EWups in this category that had attained legal status reached 420,000. (See notes to Fig. 4.1, which also includes organizations without legal status, which are referred to as "nonjuridical organizations" and shown in gray, and most "political organizations.") Further complicating any analysis is the potential confusion concerning the status of such bodies under the American taxation system (as prescribed by the Internal Revenue Service) and the Japanese legal system (as delineated by the Civil Code). We must also consider the difference between America's and Japan's federal and unitary political systems, differences in size (e.g., area, population, population density), and historical patterns of state-society relations (continuity in the United States versus discontinuity in Japan as a result of its defeat in the Second World War). Given these considerations, the original figures provide an incomplete portrait of the actual state of civil society organizations in the two countries.

An adequate institutional analysis is thus very complicated, requiring at the very least elaboration of legal status in terms of what constitutes a corporate "legal person," the nature of the taxation system (e.g., taxation of different sources of income, possible deductions for contributions and donations, the status of the receivers and contributors of such tax deductions), public administration (e.g., regulations pertaining to group formation and operation, administrative subsidies and trust systems), and the role of the courts (e.g., the extent of their influence in adjudicating these problems).

Figure 4.1 illustrates the spatial configuration of civil society organizations in Japan from the institutional perspective of legal institutionalization and taxation. The horizontal axis distinguishes between organizations legally regarded as contributing to the "public good" and for-profit organizations. The vertical axis distinguishes between organizations that are regarded as foundations or having a property nature and those that emphasize human associations as sets of persons (National Institute for Research Advancement 1995: 21-32).

As pointed out by statist analysts, organizations lacking any legal status occupy a large gray zone in the middle of Figure 4.1. Associations, unions, and any other organizations that fall within this zone are called "voluntary associations" (*nin'i dantai*) in Japan, and they amount to roughly 380,000 groups in the map. These organizations are legally considered "nonjuridical associations or foundations and the like" when they have a formal organizational structure including representation, observe the principle of majority rule, demonstrate a continuous existence regardless of membership changes, have rules of representation, and hold general meetings and the like. Organizations that meet these conditions can enjoy almost the same privileges as public-interest corporations in terms of taxation on income of less than ¥8 million (\$80,000) earned by means of nonprofit activities.⁵

This concept of "nonjuridical associations or foundations and the like" gradually developed within legal theory from the 1920s in response to the first surge of social

⁵ See the Corporation Tax Law, Articles 7 and 66 (National Institute for Research Advancement 1994: 24-25). Article 7 clearly describes the tax exemptions available to nonjuridical associations and foundations for their nonprofit activities.




Figure 4.1 Japanese civil society organizations in institutional perspective. *Note:* These figures are for 1996 or 1997. Groups and organizations are positioned on the basis of the National Institute for Research Advancement's Report No. 98-734, *Research Report on the Support System for Citizen's public-Interest Activities* (in Japanese), 1994, p. 27. The author has revised the section For-Profit Groups. The figures for each type of organization are based on the Economic Planning Agency's *Minkan h'eiri katsudo danai, ni kan s,uru keizai bunseki ch'osa* (Economic Analysis of Private Nonprofit Organizations), 1997, p. 10 (internal material), with additional material supplied by the author. *Source:* Tsujinaka and Mori

Table 4.1 *Number of Incorporated Organizations in the United States, Japan, and Korea by Type (per 100,000 persons)*

	United States	Japan	Korea
A. State-related	31	—	—
B. Party-related	—	58	—
C. Public-interest corporations, nonprofit organizations	511	273	65
D. Profit-making and general corporations	8,184	1,906	366
Total	8,726	2,237	431

Note: Different classification methods are used in each country for the "state-related" and "party-related" categories.

Source: Compiled by the author from government sources from the mid-1990s.

associations during the era of Taishō democracy. The concept was finally embodied in law by means of a Supreme Court decision in 1964.⁶ Thus, this theory is itself a product of the development of civil society organizations and democratization in Japan.

Aside from nonjuridical associations and foundations are many incorporated nonprofit organizations. Table 4.1 shows precise per capita figures for the United States/Japan, and Korea. The figures for category C, public-interest corporations and (incorporated) nonprofit organizations, are especially interesting. This category includes a variety of civil society organizations (see Fig. 4.1; for data and data sources, see Yamauchi 1999 and Nakamura and Nihon NPO Sentai 1999). Japan's figure of 273 per 100,000 persons is more than half that of the United States (511) and more than four times that of Korea (65). I expected that this sector would be smaller in Japan than in the United States, but it is noteworthy that the ratio of incorporated nonprofit organizations to all corporations in Japan is double that of the United States because of the huge size of America's for-profit sector.

The total number of incorporated organizations in Japan is rather small when compared with the United States. This does not mean that nonprofit organizations are significantly discriminated against in terms of legal status. In fact, the opposite is true. When Japan's figures are compared with Korea's, it seems remarkably easy for Japanese organizations to incorporate. This does not detract from the significance of the enactment of the NPO Law in 1998 and the introduction of a bill concerning the Intermediate Corporation Law to the Diet in 2001. Below I try to answer why this law and bill were introduced at this time.

⁶ For the Supreme Court decision, see November 14, 1964, in *Saiko saibansho hanreishu [The Supreme Court Case Report]*, vol. 18, no. 8, p. 1671. See also Hoshino 1970: 227-314.

Table 4.2 *Incorporated Associations in the Survey Instrument (Japan, the United States, and Korea)*

	Japan	United States	Korea
Associations (capital)a	60.3%	86.8%	58.2%
Sample size	1,438	748	371
Associations (region)a	67.5%	85.4%	44.5%
Sample size	197	752	110

percentage of incorporated associations out of total samples.

Note: Japan and Korea data from 1997, U.S. data from 1999.

Source: Surveys conducted by Tsujinaka Yutaka as part of the Japanese Interest Group Survey (nGS) Project.

Focusing on active groups, Table 4.2 shows the proportion of incorporated associations examined in the JIGS Project surveys in each country. Once again, the ratio is highest in the United States, followed by Japan, then Korea. From an institutional-statist perspective, the United States seems to be more open and generous in incorporating broad groups. The U.S. figure is only 1.5 to 2 times higher than that of Japan, however (see Table 4.1, category C). In Japan, advocacy groups such as citizen-led groups concerned with the environment and welfare demonstrate lower rates of incorporation than groups in other categories, but the potential inconvenience of their status should not be serious except in terms of legitimacy. It is interesting to note that nonprofit organizations constitute a larger share of all corporations in Japan and Korea than in the United States. In this context, Japan's severe regulatory policies do not target nonprofit organizations.

Society and Civil Society Organizations: Social Establishments

Although the institutional-statist approach successfully highlights the vector of state policy, its reach is limited to formal civil society organizations. Examination of the Establishment Censuses of Japan and Korea and the County Business Patterns of the United States⁷ yields information on how many actual offices these organizations maintain and how many people work for them. By means of these statistics, we can understand both the organizational reality of society and the social outcomes of state policy.

In this context, an "establishment" is defined as "an economic unit, generally at a single physical location, where business is conducted or where service or industrial operations are performed" (Executive Office of the President 1987: 12). For a place of business to be considered an establishment, it must serve as an enduring location for a specific group's activities and have more than one employee. Each

⁷ Conducted every three to five years, Japan's Establishment Census has been the government's second census since 1947. Comparable data are available since 1951 in Japan, since 1959 in the United States, and since 1981 in Korea.

country's statistics offer categories that merit further study: in Japan, Category No. 94 (Political, Economic, and Cultural Associations, which comprises four subcategories but excludes religious association); in the United States, Category No. 86 (Membership Organizations, which comprises six subcategories, of which I exclude religious associations to make the statistics more comparable with those of Japan); and in Korea, Category No. 91 (Membership Organizations, which comprises six subcategories, of which I exclude religious associations). Civil society organizations with establishments embody social capital in general terms, if not as specifically defined by Robert Putnam (1993). In comparison with those for institutions and active groups, the range of these statistics is fairly narrow.

For each country, Table 4.3 compares the absolute number of civil society establishments, the relative weight of different subcategories, and their standardized density per 100,000 persons. The first noteworthy fact is the similarity in density (Japan, 30.3; the United States, 35.6; and Korea, 29.2)⁸ of associational establishments among the three different countries in the mid-1990s. Despite their differences in culture and the amount of time they have enjoyed democratic regimes, they are now similar inasmuch as they all boast liberal-democratic regimes and highly industrialized societies. These similarities belie the institutional differences analyzed above.

Nevertheless, it is easy to divine differences among the three countries in their paths to the present. On a per capita basis, Japan's figures for civil society establishments were less than one-third of America's in the 1960s and half in the 1970s before approaching the U.S. figure during the 1980s. Korea recorded a distinct up-and-down pattern during the 1980s and a major surge in the 1990s.

Differences also exist among the countries' subcategories⁹ and in their compositions. The Japanese pattern is very simple: a long-lasting predominance by business associations, which accounted for one-third to one-half of the total in all periods. This can be labeled civil society developmentalism (Johnson 1982; Tsujinaka 1996: 5-9). Since the late 1980s, however, the supremacy in numbers long enjoyed by business has been eroded by the category "not elsewhere categorized" (NEC).

This NEC category includes many civic associations and semipublic organizations (mostly membership associations), such as alumni associations, fraternal associations, social clubs, taxpayer associations, parent-teacher groups, foreigners' ethnic federations, sport and hobby federations, *YM/YWCAs*, and so on (see Tsujinaka 1988: 80-85; Tsujinaka 1996: 36-41; Tsujinaka 2002: 85-87). The JIGS survey of active groups based on Japanese telephone directories also includes a large category titled "other (NEC)." This category contains a variety of semipublic associations and federations (30 to 40 percent of the total), ranging

⁸ Based on these surveys, Japan's *employee* density in the associational sector is still only 60 percent of America's, and Korea, too, was behind in the late 1990s.

⁹ Japan lacks the categories "civil" (as does Korea) and "professional." The former is included in the category not elsewhere classified (NEC), and the latter is dispersed among the business, academic-cultural, and NEC categories.

Table 4.3 *The Absolute Number, Composition, and Density per 100,000 Persons of Associations, 1960-1996*

	Japan, 1996			United States, 1995			Korea, 1996		
	Number	%	Density	Number	%	Density	Number	%	Density
Total	37,982	100.0	30.3	93,754	100.0	35.6	13,078	100.0	29.2
Business	14,728	38.8	11.8	14,643	15.6	5.6	1,230	9.4	2.7
Labor	5,248	13.8	4.2	18,819	20.1	7.2	1,552	11.9	3.5
Political	840	2.2	0.7	1,897	2.0	0.7	827	6.3	1.8
Civil				41,764	44.5	15.9			
Professional				5,871	6.3	2.2	875	6.7	2.0
Academic	942	2.5	0.8						
NEC ^a	16,224	42.7	13.0	10,760	11.5	4.1	8,594	65.7	19.2
	Japan, 1991			United States, 1990			Korea, 1991		
Total	36,140	100.0	29.2	88,725	100.0	35.5	4,103	100.0	9.5
Business	13,798	38.2	11.1	12,677	13.4	5.1	1,946	47.4	4.5
Labor	5,116	14.2	4.1	19,246	23.4	7.7	497	12.1	1.2
Political	828	2.3	0.7	1,653	1.4	0.7	645	15.7	1.5
Civil				39,999	44.8	16.0			
Professional				5,480	6.0	2.2	703	17.1	1.6
Academic	878	2.4	0.7						
NEC	15,520	42.9	12.5	9,670	10.7	3.9	312	7.6	0.7
	Japan, 1986			United States, 1986			Korea, 1986		
Total	33,668	100.0	27.7	84,989	100.0	35.2	5,604	100.0	13.5
Business	13,386	39.7	11.0	11,637	13.6	4.8	3,309	59.0	8.0
Labor	4,816	14.3	4.0	20,577	24.1	8.5	146	2.6	0.4

Political	790	2.3	0.7	1,315	1.5	0.5	352	6.3	0.9
Civil				37,067	43.3	15.3			
Professional				5,236	6.1	2.2	733	13.1	1.8
Academic	679	2.0	0.6						
NEC	13,997	41.6	11.5	9,157	10.7	3.8	1,064	19.0	2.6
Japan, 1975			United States, 1976				Korea, 1981		
Total	20,614	100.0	18.4	80,224	100.0	37.3	4,962	100.0	12.8
Business	10,027	48.6	9.0	12,077	15.6	5.6	3,576	72.1	9.2
Labor	2,268	11.0	2.0	22,265	27.6	10.3	186	3.7	0.5
Political	532	2.6	0.5	1,371	1.7	0.6	207	4.2	0.5
Civil				33,854	42.0	15.7			
Professional				3,746	4.6	1.7	254	5.1	0.7
Academic	455	2.2	0.4						
NEC	7,332	35.6	6.5	6,911	8.6	3.2	739	14.9	1.9
Japan, 1960			United States, 1962				no data available		
Total	10,357	100.0	11.1	62,542	100.0	34.6			
Business	4,698	45.4	5.0	11,141	17.8	6.2			
Labor	1,572	15.1	1.7	18,976	30.3	10.5			
Political	169	1.6	0.2	815	1.3	0.5			
Civil				25,236	40.3	14.0			
Professional				1,558	2.5	0.9			
Academic	147	1.4	0.2						
NEC	3,771	36.4	4.0	4,816	7.7	2.7			

a/NEC: Not elsewhere classified

Sources: Japan: Establishment Census, Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency; United States: County Business Patterns, U.S. Bureau of Census; Korea: Report on Establishment Census, National Statistical Office.

from Traffic Safety Associations under the supervision of the Police Agency (an extreme case) to the benefit society for local public servants and a variety of civic associations (35 to 50 percent), such as sport or hobby clubs, academic societies, international and fraternal societies, social clubs, residential groups, and miscellaneous organizations that cannot be otherwise classified. Now the largest of the five categories, NEC is thus equally comprised of civic and semipublic organizations. For the purposes of international comparison, we could rename the category "civic and other."

Thus, in terms of social establishments, Japan's associational sector is a steadily expanding part of civil society as a whole, and there now exists an equilibrium between this expanding sector of civic and semipublic organizations and the relatively stagnant sector of business associations.

Active Groups in Practice

As explained above, associations with establishments account for only a limited number of civil society organizations. Many associations without establishments (i.e., that lack a permanent office or employees) are nonetheless active.¹⁰ The challenge is how to delineate these groups. One answer is to investigate associations listed in the telephone directory and conduct a random-sampling survey. This method is more comprehensive than surveying groups that are listed in association directories or the Establishment Census (Tsujinaka 2002: 50-60). It should offer a clearer approximation of the reality of active groups because a group cannot be active today without a telephone. My survey was conducted in one metropolitan capital area and one nearby local region in each country. Table 4.4 compares the number and density of associations listed in the metropolitan capital and regional telephone directories in each of the three countries.¹²

The metropolitan capital areas confirm my preliminary ideas concerning the pluralistic associational world of the United States: the per capita figure for

10 The Economic Planning Agency conducted a comprehensive survey of Japanese citizen groups other than public-interest corporations to grasp the background situation for the NPO Law. It found that only 7 percent of all groups have a permanent office (whether rented or owned), and only 18 percent have more than one salaried staff (Shakai Ch6sa Kenkyūjō 1997; see also Tokyo Metropolitan Government 1996).

11 One local region (*ken* in Japan, *do* in Korea, and state in the United States) was selected in each country using the criteria of location relatively near the metropolitan capital area, a regional nature mixing urban and rural areas, and a certain representative character. The hope is that these factors will permit inferences about other regional locales.

12 According to database information that has recently become available on NTT's website, 198,000 unions and associations were listed in Japan's telephone directories in July 2000. The union and association category includes more than 20 subcategories. This coverage is slightly broader than the survey population targeted in my JIGS surveys. According to NTT's database, Tokyo ranks first in absolute number and 37th in density (per 100,000 persons) out of Japan's 47 prefectures. Ibaraki ranks 25th in absolute number and 41st in density. Because the average density throughout Japan is 156, the average density during the survey period (1997) might have been higher than in Tokyo and Ibaraki.

Table 4.4 *Number of Associations in the Telephone Directory*

	Japan		Korea		United States	
	Tokyo	Ibaraki	Seoul	Gyeonggi-do	Washington, D.C.	North Carolina
Associations per 100,000 people	181.5	59.5	80.2	37.8	596.9	54.4
Number of associations	21,366	1,762	8,647	2,874	3,122	4,106
Population (10,000)	1,177	296	1,078	761	52.3	755

Notes: Japanese and Korean data from 1997, U.S. data from 1999. The population for the surveys is the number of associations in the telephone directory. See Tsujinaka 1999a, 1999b, and 2001a.

Source: Surveys conducted by Tsujinaka Yutaka as part of the Japanese Interest Group Survey (JIGS) Project.

Washington, D.C. (close to 600), is more than three times Tokyo's (182) and more than seven times Seoul's. Tokyo hosts the greatest absolute number of associations (21,366), however, followed by Seoul (8,647) and Washington, D.C. (3,122).

Differences among these capitals should not be ignored. Although Washington, D.C., is famous for specializing in politics, the other two metropolitan capitals are huge cities. In this sense, Seoul and Tokyo might be more comparable. Although the same problem may apply to the local regions of Japan's Ibaraki, Korea's Gyeonggi, and America's North Carolina, it is interesting to find similarities among them. Ibaraki has the most associations per capita (59.5), followed by North Carolina (54.4) and Gyeonggi (37.8). The first two figures are quite close, and the second is less than 1.6 times the third. As was true of social establishments, it seems likely that a similar number of groups are active in each of these local regions.

Table 4.5, which is also based on the JIGS survey, permits further analysis of the composition of active groups in each country. The survey asked target organizations to choose one of eleven classifications (one of ten in the Japanese survey; see note e in Table 4.5). To simplify the resulting data, I integrated the responses into three major and two residual categories: the producer sector (original classification: agriculture, business, or labor), the social service sector (educational, governmental, social welfare, or professional), the advocacy sector (political/public and citizen), religious associations, and not elsewhere classified.

Japanese organizations tend to cluster in the business, labor, governmental, and NEC categories (see section B of Table 4.5); Japan's professional sector is smaller than Korea's and America's. When gathered into broader categories (section A of Table 4.5), a larger share of groups fall into the producer and NEC categories in Japan than in the other two countries, and a smaller share into the social service and advocacy categories. This is the same developmentalist configuration as we saw in the Establishment Census, with business associations or the producer category clearly predominating.

Table 4.5 *The Proportions of Different Types of Civil Society Organizations in Japan, the United States, and Korea (5 major sectors and 11 categories, percentage)*

Organization type	A		
	Tokyo	Seoul	Washington, D.C.
Producer	29.8	18.7	22.3
Social service	34.1	41.4	40.7
Advocacy	6.3	10.5	8.7
Religious	0.9	9.9	4.3
NEC ^b	28.9	19.5	24.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1,403	353	715

Organization type	Be		
	Tokyo	Seoul	Washington, D.C.
Agricultural	2.5	3.7	1.5
Trade, business	19.5	11.0	17.4
Labor union	7.8	4.0	3.4
Education	8.8	8.5	18.7
Governmental	9.7	4.8	2.1
Social welfare	6.1	14.4	4.9
Professional	9.6	13.6	15.0
Political, public	2.1	2.5	6.6
Citizen	4.3	7.9	2.1 ^d
Religious ^e	0.9	9.9	4.3
Other	28.9	19.5	24.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1,403	353	715

Q Respondents were asked, "Which one classification best describes your organization?"

b Not elsewhere classified.

c The U.S. survey has fifteen categories that were later collapsed into eleven for purposes of comparison with other countries.

d Only environmental groups are included in this category.

e Japan's survey has no category for "religious groups," but the "not elsewhere classified" (NEC) category includes some religious associations.

Source: Surveys conducted by Tsujinaka Yutaka and the Japanese Interest Group Survey (nGS) Group.

Summary

With regard to the number of civil society organizations in Japan in the late 1990s, institutional groups numbered more than 400,000, followed by about 200,000 active groups listed in telephone directories and about 40,000 establishments (the ratio among the three types of groups is thus 10:5:1).

From the institutional-statist perspective, there is a sizable difference among the three countries in incorporated nonprofit organizations: the United States has the

most organizations of this type, followed by Japan (with about half as many on a per capita basis), and finally Korea (with about one-eighth the U.S. figure). From the social establishment perspective, all three countries enjoyed similar organizational densities in the late 1990s. From the active-group perspective, although there are clear differences among the metropolitan capital areas, the local regions are remarkably similar. I emphasize the similarities rather than the differences in social establishments and those groups that are active at the local level to correct statist portrayals of an exaggerated gap between the United States and Japan.

There was a major dichotomy among the three countries in the composition of their social establishments. In sharp contrast to the United States, Japan displays developmentalism, having many business associations, as Korea did in the 1980s. Japan also displays a gradual pluralization, however, which I elaborate below. Surveys of active groups confirmed these observations.

Historical Paths: Development by Waves, Shifting Emphases, and Maturity

Along which historical paths have Japan's characteristics been formed? I first trace these paths descriptively and then analyze the data within a historical framework.

Overview

Although verifying causal relations is difficult, there is an interesting parallel between the global waves of democratization that Huntington (1991) perceived and waves in the vitalization of civil society organizations in Japan.

Throughout the long period (1826-1926) of the first democratization wave (Huntington 1991: 16), Japan progressed through the stages of building a nation-state (from the Meiji Restoration of 1868), establishing a modern constitutional system (1889), forming a party-led government (1918, 1924-32), and granting universal manhood suffrage (1925). As shown in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 below, several brief upsurges of civil society organization formation occurred before the Second World War: around the turn of the century, from 1921 to 1933, and around 1940. The period of 1921 to 1933 coincided with Taisho democracy and the early Showa era. Even during this relatively democratic period, however, the state did not approve of the institutionalization of voluntary, society-led organizations in social or political processes (Miyazaki 1984; Muramatsu, ItG, and Tsujinaka 1986; Tsujinaka 1988). This was symbolized by the failure to enact a labor union law during the 1920s. Civil society organizations could maintain a de facto existence through social activities alone. Nevertheless, because almost all kinds of social organizations did in fact exist in the Taisho period, it can be regarded as the formative period of Japan's civil society.

Throughout the tsunami-like second wave (1943-62) of democratization (Huntington 1991: 18-19), Japan institutionalized and consolidated its civil society by enacting a democratic constitution (1947) and a variety of laws

legitimizing labor unions, agricultural cooperatives, consumer cooperatives, small- and medium-sized business cooperatives, and business associations. Japan went through a period of mass movements that culminated in a number of watershed events during the late 1950s and 1960s. This period carved the highest and sharpest notch in the record of establishing civil society organizations. Ultimately, the state simultaneously (1964) abandoned revision of the constitution and formally accepted wide-scale collective bargaining (the spring wage offensive, or *shunto*) by the labor movement. As noted above, the Supreme Court finally ratified the legal theory of "nonjuridical associations or foundations and the like" in the very same year to provide unincorporated voluntary associations a status that was almost equal to that of public-interest corporations.

During this era, civil society organizations' participation in the political process gained legitimacy. Core organizations were mainly employers' associations and their labor union rivals, which supported the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), respectively, under the so-called 1955 regime. Under this regime, Japan became a fully participatory and cooperative developmental state (Johnson 1982; Tsujinaka 1996; see also the discussions of "welfare corporatism" by Dore 1989 and "corporatism without labor" by Pempel and Tsunekawa 1979 and Pempel 1998).

During the third wave (1974 to the present) of democratization (Huntington 1991: 23-25), nonproducer sectors gained significance. Japan's policy-making process has been intermittently disturbed by emerging citizen-led movements of consumers, students, women, and opponents to pollution since the end of the 1960s. This tide led to the election of many progressive local governments in urban areas during the 1970s, which in turn pushed the national government to change environmental and welfare policies.

Since the 1980s, under the combined pressures of globalization, liberalization, and deregulation (Pempel 1998), such ruling actors as governing-party politicians, bureaucrats, and business leaders have gradually realized the need for and utility of citizen-led voluntary organizations (Yamamoto et al. 1998). This rethinking by old actors and the emergence of new citizen-led organizations suddenly became visible after the mass media focused on NGOs and NPOs in the 1990s (Kawakami 1999). Japan's civil society matured in terms of organizing the citizen-led nonproducer sector. The 1998 NPO Law was a symbolic event starting this trend. In the late 1990s, civil society organizations rapidly acquired legitimacy as actors in the policy-making process (Yamamoto 1998).

The effects of the second and third waves of democratization - the consolidation and maturation of Japan's civil society - can be traced to different patterns in civil society organizations. On the basis of previous studies (Iuramatsu et al. 1986; Tsujinaka 1988; Tsujinaka 1996), I inferred as a tentative hypothesis that civil society organizations were established in Japan in the following order:

1. associations and political organizations created among the elite, and professional associations and major business firms (in the producer and social service sectors);
2. business circles and economic organizations (producer sector);

3. industry associations and labor unions (producer sector);
4. policy-taker groups and pressure groups (producer and social service sectors); and
5. citizen movements, international NGOs, public interest-promoting organizations, and citizen lobbies (advocacy sector).

In other words, groups developed in the order of elite organizations, producer organizations, policy pressure groups, and civil advocacy organizations, or, in broader terms, in the order of the producer sector, the social service sector, and the advocacy sector. This cycle can be observed over the long or mid-term, and in both the pre- and postwar periods. When regimes changed, existing organizations were abolished or reorganized and the cycle repeated itself. Comparative studies should verify whether this is a universal tendency or one that is distinctly Japanese. This should also relate to the logic of organizational capital (Walker 1991) or more broadly to the logic of path dependence and the institutional complementarity of Japan's sociopolitical system (Aoki and Okuno 1996). In any event, if there is truth to this observation, NGO- or NPO-type citizen-led organizations surfaced as a transient phenomenon in the past, but they have gradually increased their resources and expanded their networks in the same manner as other social organizations: first acquiring legitimacy in the social process, then in the political process, and finally in the policy-making process.

This hypothesis derives from a variety of empirical evidence that I have collected over time (see especially Tsujinaka 1988, 1996). The task at hand is to verify this hypothesis more empirically and systematically. To that end, I analyze establishment data for the postwar period, establishment income data for private nonprofit associations for the 1980s and 1990s, and data on the formation years of active groups (JIGS).

Postwar Developmentalism Among Civil Society Organizations in Japan

In comparison with the United States and Korea, Japan's establishment data paint a picture of steady growth punctuated by waves of vitalization of civil society organizations. On the basis of Figure 4.2 for organizational density and Table 4.3 for absolute numbers, we can describe each country's development as follows. In general, the American situation has been very stable. Year by year, the number of organizations has gradually increased. The absolute number of organizations grew 46 percent between 1959 and 1998, an average annual increase of 0.97 percent. With density per capita almost stagnant at approximately 35 organizations per 100,000 persons, America's civil society seems to have been saturated for four decades. The composition figures reveal a continuous predominance of civil citizen-led organizations. Although the density figures for labor have gradually decreased, those for the business sector, in decline at one point, show a moderate increase in recent years. With civil society in the United States changing moderately in terms of content but stagnant in terms of density, change appears to have a zero-sum quality.




Figure 4.2a The number of associational establishments by subcategory, Japan, 1951-99 (per 100,000 persons). *Source:* Establishment Census, Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency.




Figure 4.2b The number of associational establishments by subcategory, United States, 1959-98 (per 100,000 persons). *Source:* County Business Patterns, U.S. Bureau of the Census.

By contrast, Korea displays drastic fluctuations in the limited period of 1981 to 1996. The number of organizations decreased in the late 1980s until 1991, then tripled during the brief period of 1991 to 1996. Korea's organizational density also increased from one-third of Japan's level in 1991 to equality in 1996. With explosive growth occurring in the NEC (consisting substantially of citizen-led organizations) and labor categories, the composition of civil society shifted from the predominance of business to dominance by NEC organizations. The Korean situation since 1991 appears to be revolutionary, but interpretation is problematic: Do we see an associational bubble, well-established pluralism, or elite-led pluralism (Tsujinaka, Lee, and Yeom 1998)?

In comparison to these two societies, Japan's civil society has demonstrated steady growth in numbers. Between 1957 and 1999, the absolute number of civil society organizations more than quadrupled, growing at an annual average rate of 3.6 percent. Per capita density grew at an annual average rate of 2.7 percent until




Figure 4.2c The number of associational establishments by subcategory, Korea, 1981-96 (per 100,000 persons). *Source:* Report on Establishment Census, National Statistical Office.

density reached about 85 percent of the U.S. figure in the mid-1990s. Although business associations still predominate, their position has gradually weakened, falling ten percentage points from their peak. In addition, the NEC category has continuously increased in strength - since 1986, it has been the largest category - but its growth apparently stagnated in the late 1990s.

Although the steady growth of Japan's civil society organizations is remarkable, it seems that the locus of association establishment has been influenced by economic expansion. Using density figures, Figure 4.3 graphically portrays the relationship between changes in the total number of establishments in all industries (mainly companies), which represent business cycles and general economic conditions, and changes in association establishment.

In contrast to the situations in the United States and Korea, it is very clear that in Japan there is a parallel between the two: the economy and associations have grown in proportion to one another. Because this observation is still impressionistic, I calculated for Japan and the United States the simple correlation coefficients between the per capita number of associational establishments and total establishments in all industries, between the per capita number of employees in associational establishments and total establishments in all industries, between fluctuations in the per capita number of associational establishments and total establishments in all industries, and between fluctuations in the number of per capita employees in associational establishments and total establishments in all industries (see Tables 4.6-4.9).

The results are telling. On every score, Japan's associational world exhibits stronger correlations than does America's. Except for fluctuations in the number of associations, total figures for association establishment correlate significantly with all industry-related figures. The same is true for the number of associational employees. There are many interesting variations in the correlation coefficients of subcategories.




Figure 4.3a Associational establishments versus total establishments in all industries, Japan, 1951-99 (per 100,000 persons). *Source:* See Fig. 4.2a.




Figure 4.3b Associational establishments versus total establishments in all industries, United States, 1959-98 (per 100,000 persons). *Source:* See Fig. 4.2b.




Figure 4.3c Associational establishments versus total establishments in all industries, Korea, 1981-96 (per 100,000 persons). *Source:* See Fig. 4.2c.

Table 4.6 *Correlation Between the per Capita Number of Associational Establishments and Total Establishments in All Industries*

	period	Organizations							
		Total	Economy	Labor	Science/Civil ^a	Political	Other	Agricultural/Professional ^a	Religion
Japan	1957-99	0.865**	0.909**	0.733**	0.772**	0.955**	0.800**	-0.433 (-0.770) ^b	-0.891**
United States	1959-98	0.367	-0.388	-0.899**	0.438	0.734**	0.408	0.900**	0.974**

^aThe organizations on the top refer only to Japan and the organizations on the bottom refer only to the United States.

^bThe correlation coefficient is for the period 1960-99.

**A coefficient with two-tailed observed significance levels less than 0.01. This means that the probability that a correlation coefficient would be obtained when there is no linear association between variables in the population is less than 1 percent.

Source: Japan: Establishment Census, Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency; United States: County Business Patterns, U.S. Bureau of Census.

Table 4.7 *Correlation Between the per Capita Number of Employees in Associational Establishments and Total Establishments in All Industries*

	Period	Employees							
		Total	Economy	Labor	Science/Civil ^a	Political	Other	Agricultural/Professional ^a	Religion
Japan	1957-99	0.930**	0.979**	0.751**	0.884**	0.802**	0.858**	0.707** (0.473) ^b	0.762**
United States	1959-98	0.598**	0.900**	0.351	0.924**	0.846**	-0.127	0.978**	0.968**

Notes: See Table 4.6.

Source: See Table 4.6

Table 4.8 *Correlation of Fluctuations in the per Capita Number of Associational Establishments and Total Establishments in All Industries*

	Period	Organizations							
		Total	Economy	Labor	Science/Civil ^a	Political	Other	Agricultural/Professional ^a	Religion
Japan	1957-99	0.559	0.552	0.331	0.007	0.770**	0.377	-0.109 (0.193) ^b	-0.079
United States	1959-98	0.172	-0.083	0.318	0.335	0.057	-0.178	0.287	0.683**

Notes: See Table 4.6.

Source: See Table 4.6.

Table 4.9 *Correlation of Fluctuations in the Number of per Capita Employees in Associational Establishments and Total Establishments in All Industries*

	Period	Employees							
		Total	Economy	Labor	Science/Civil ^a	Political	Other	Agricultural/Professional ^a	Religion
Japan	1957-99	0.672*	0.759**	0.327	0.390	0.259	0.449	0.746** (0.811**) ^b	0.241
United States	1959-98	-0.039	-0.012	0.092	0.293	-0.134	-0.153	0.128	0.354

Notes: See Table 4.6.

* A coefficient with two-tailed observed significance levels less than 0.05. This means that the probability that a correlation coefficient would be obtained when there is no linear association between variables in the population is less than 5 percent.

Source: See Table 4.6.

This statistical analysis suggests that Japan's associational world is strongly influenced by trends in the business cycle and economic conditions. In part, this is because of the high proportion of business groups, but other categories are also influenced by business conditions. In this context, Japan's associational world continues to display developmentalism.

The Formation of Active Groups

From my telephone directory data concerning active groups, we can construct a more detailed representation of the associational world. Because the data were collected in 1997 (Japan and Korea) and 1999 (the United States), we must remember that the data reveal the "birth years" of only those associations that existed at the time of these surveys. These are not data concerning the actual volume of group formation,¹³ but they are informative nonetheless because they suggest trends of association formation and represent the sudden, gradual, and eventual appearance of associations that has been illustrated by other sources (see Tsujinaka et al. 1998). In addition, these statistics indicate which generations of associations have been long lasting. Figure 4.4 shows the birth year frequency statistics of civil society organizations in five major sectors.

Each of these graphs displays a distinctive peak-formation period: the period 1946-50 for Japan, the 1970s and 1980s for the United States, and 1991-95 for Korea. These periods of eruptive association formation are closely related to regime change in each country. One reasonable inference is that regime change inevitably causes the formation of new associations and pressures old associations to restructure and realign. Another inference is that the new associations that appeared immediately after such changes were strong enough to survive until the time of the survey.

Subcategories of associations display their own patterns (for the five categories, see Table 4.5). Figure 4.4 is based on figures that indicate not only patterns, but also the relative scale of each sector. The three nations underwent distinctive waves of association formation, with each sector following a pattern that confirms the differences among the three countries (Fig. 4.5 articulates these patterns even more clearly). In Japan, for example, fewer organizations form in the advocacy sector than in other sectors (except the religious one), and the formation figures in the social service sector are consistently large in both the United States and Korea.

To simplify our analysis, we can concentrate on just the producer, social service, and advocacy sectors. Figure 4.5 illustrates what percentage of each sector's organizations formed during each period. In Japan, the producer sector peaked immediately after the Second World War, with a subsequent tendency to decline;

¹³ Birth-year statistics differ from the actual volume of group formation because they exclude groups that disappeared prior to the year of the survey. These statistics also differ from establishment statistics that illustrate the total number of existing associations. Regardless of these issues, birth year statistics offer many analytical insights. As a good example of this kind of analysis, see Walker 1991.




Figure 4.4 Formation of civil society organizations in five sectors in Japan, the United States, and Korea (capital city comparisons, number of foundations, five-year totals). *Note:* Japanese and Korean data from 1997, U.S. data from 1999. *Source:* Surveys conducted by Tsujinaka Yutaka and the Japanese Interest Group Survey (JIGS) Group, Cross-National Survey on Civil Society Organizations and Interest Groups (Japan), 1997; Cross-National Survey on Civil Society Organizations and Interest Groups (U.S.A.), 1999; and Cross-National Survey on Civil Society Organizations and Interest Groups (Korea), 1997.

the social sector's curve is relatively flat and tends to plateau, but the accents are moderately high immediately after the Second World War, between 1960 and 1975, and throughout the 1990s; and the advocacy sector peaks during the periods immediately after the war to 1960, around 1970, and between 1985 and 1995, with a further tendency to increase in recent years. In the United States, the




Figure 4.4 (cont.)

producer sector features a low hill in the 1930s and 1940s and a moderate, gently waving curve with some surges between 1970 and 1990; the social service sector shows a moderate curve with small peaks in the periods 1910-20 and 1945-60 and some surges between 1970 and 1990; and the advocacy sector surges throughout the 1970s and the 1990s. In Korea, the producer sector peaks around 1970 and between the 1980s and 1995; the social service sector shows a big surge between the 1970s and 1995; and the advocacy sector surges strongly between the late 1980s and 1995.

Why did association formation surge during each of these periods? And why did associations that appeared during these surges succeed in surviving to the time of the survey? This could be related to the nature and mechanisms of the political regime in each state. In terms of cross-national similarities, only the advocacy sectors of the three countries follow comparable paths, with accents during the 1970s and the 1990s.¹⁴

Japan's path is distinctive. It alone shows sharp contrasts among the producer, social service, and advocacy sectors. An "age of producers" immediately followed the Second World War and continued until 1975. The social service sector has maintained a stable association formation pattern. And the advocacy sector, while consistently accounting for less than 10 percent of all associations except during the short period of 1926 to 1930 and throughout the 1990s, has been expanding gradually but with waves throughout the postwar era, especially since 1990. Thus, the emphasis has gradually shifted from the producer to the social service sector,

14 This similarity may be due in part to the vulnerability of the advocacy sector in any country because of its relative shortage of organizational resources. On the other hand, each peak is pronounced enough to remind us of certain eras marked by democratic movements in these three countries. These curves thus have specific meanings.




Figure 4.5 Formation of civil society organizations in the producer, social service, and advocacy sectors in Japan, the United States, and Korea (capital city comparisons, five-year totals (%)) *Source:* See Figure 4.4.




Figure 4:5 (2008)

with a moderately increasing advocacy sector. I would characterize this as the maturation of civil society in Japan.

Summary

Above I proposed a cycle of association formation: from the producer sector to the social service sector and finally to the advocacy sector. In addition, I hypothesized that each type of association progresses through penetration of social processes to political processes and finally to the policy-making process. The earlier the sector appears and penetrates a process, the deeper its roots there. The establishment data reveal an impressive and steady expansion of Japan's associational world in comparison to, and highly correlated with, the overall expansion of industry. The active group data verify a shift in emphasis and levels of maturity within civil society from the producer to the social service sector, with an increasing advocacy sector.

The Structure and Nature of Japanese Civil Society Organizations

Documenting numerical trends in and the composition of Japan's population of civil society organizations, we have confirmed that in comparative perspective, its civil society has been steadily expanding while remaining weighted toward business associations and exhibiting moderate pluralization in the NEC (civil and related) category. New association formation is shifting from the producer and social service sectors to the advocacy sector. Given certain theoretical inferences, this kind of quantitative analysis is presumably indicative of such qualitative change as regime transformation. But are these inferences valid? Let us delve more deeply into the quality and structure of Japan's civil society.

Business Supremacy and Pluralization: Associational Establishment Income

Can the supremacy of business associations or tendencies toward pluralization be interpolated by examining the income statistics of associational establishments? Available statistics (Economic Planning Agency 1981-98) cover business, labor, culture/academic, and NEC associational establishments between 1981 and 1998. This coverage is close to that of the preceding two sections but excludes political associations. IS

15 The statistics of the *Report on the Conditions of Private Nonprofit Organizations* (*Minkai hieiri dantai jittai hokoku*) have been collected annually since 1981 by the Economic Research Institute of the Economic Planning Agency (EPA; located since 2001 in the Cabinet Office). They are based on random-sampling surveys of approximately 2,000 samples, including all nonprofit establishments employing more than fifty persons. See also EPA 1998 for estimates of their financial size. For NGOs, see Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation 1996b.

The statistics show a rapid and steady expansion of associational income. From 1981 until 1996, total associational income increased from ¥2,335 billion (\$23.35 billion) to ¥5,035 billion (\$50.35 billion), an aggregate growth of 116 percent, which translates into an annual average growth of 5.3 percent. This growth rate is far higher than those of the number of establishments and the number of employees in associational establishments.¹⁶ Even after Japan's economic bubble burst, civil society organizations maintained high rates of growth in income, with total income peaking in 1996. The data also illustrate the interesting fact that labor's income peaked in 1996 and dropped 43 percent the following year, and the income of the NEC (civil and other) category similarly peaked in 1997 and suddenly declined 32 percent the following year.¹⁷ These facts remind us of the significance of the enactment of the NPO Law in 1998. After civil society organizations had increased in number of establishments and employees and radically expanded their incomes, they faced serious barriers to future growth in the period 1996-97, and they may have felt anxious about future budgetary problems.

The contrast between the 1980s and 1990s in income distribution is remarkably clear: First, the business sector maintained a continuous superiority in both periods, with a share in excess of 40 percent, which was slightly larger than its share of associational establishments and employees. Nevertheless, the 1990s saw a reduction in business's share from 50 to 43 percent, while the share of NEC (civil and other associations) increased from 34 to 42 percent. Meanwhile the share of labor and academic/culture associations shrank over this period.

These income statistics offer more qualitative evidence for both the tenacious developmentalism and the gradual pluralization (maturity) hypotheses.

The Relative Strength of Civil Society Organizations

While we have consistently confirmed the coexistence of both tenacious developmentalism and an emerging mature pluralism in Japan, one remaining area of controversy is the relative strength of civil society organizations, especially within the advocacy sector (i.e., civic, political, and public-interest groups). The statist perspective emphasizes this sector's vulnerability and dependency, but is this portrayal accurate?

I tested this in terms of organizational resources in the active groups data drawn from the JIGS telephone directory surveys of the metropolitan capital and a local region. To discern organizational resources, I focused on membership figures,

16 The number of associational establishments in all four categories increased from 28,579 to 37,142, an aggregate growth rate of 30 percent, which translates into an annual average of 1.8 percent. The number of employees in the four categories of associational establishments increased from 155,119 to 232,033, an aggregate growth rate of 50 percent, which translates into an annual average of 2.7 percent.

17 There appear to be lags between the business cycle, the budgets of business organizations, and the budgets of labor and NEC organizations. Several years after Japan's long downturn had begun, business organizations suffered budgetary declines from 1993 until 1997. Several years after business organizations had begun to suffer, labor and NEC organizations followed suit.

permanent staff size, and income. First, I compared the overall strength of civil society organizations.

In the three countries' capitals, we find obvious similarities in the distribution of membership (the modes are the categories 100 to 500 and 1,000 to 5,000 members) and staff size (three to thirty employees). The United States lies at the top of a ladder-shaped pattern among the three countries, followed by Japan and then Korea. As for income, the United States and Japan show clear similarities (the modes are the categories ¥30 million to ¥100 million (\$300,000 to \$1 million) and ¥200 million to ¥1 billion (\$2 million to \$10 million)), but the ladder-shaped pattern is even more evident: the United States leads again, followed by Japan and Korea.

It is interesting to note that in the local regions, Japanese groups demonstrate the most organizational resources as measured by all three indices, followed by the United States and Korea.¹⁸ I contrasted staff size in the metropolitan capitals and the local regions. Staff size is regarded as the most important index for comparative purposes because differences in purchasing power and other organizational characteristics can be ignored. Japan ranks second in its capital, but first in its region. Regional civil society organizations in Japan seem to be richer in resources than in the United States and Korea.

Turning now to the advocacy sector, Table 4.10 compares its organizations' strength to the average strength of all civil society organizations in the three countries. Generally, membership figures for the advocacy sector are above average in the three countries. As for staff size and income, civil associations in Japan are weaker than the average, but political associations are typical of all civil society organizations. In Korea, neither civil nor political associations are unusual. In the United States as well, they are either typical or slightly above average.

It is necessary to point out that the survey had a higher response rate in Japan, so it is possible that small groups are more heavily represented there due to the comprehensiveness of the survey. Regional figures are for reference rather than for exact comparisons because of the small sample sizes.

In conclusion, our data on active groups do suggest the relative vulnerability of civic but not political associations in Japan in international perspective.

Conclusion

Because the size and quality of civil society organizations are key measures of the health of a democracy, I have attempted to measure the associational life of Japan and compare it with that of the United States and Korea from three angles: those of state-recognized institutions, social establishments, and active groups. My main purpose here was to provide fully documented evidence to contribute to further

¹⁸ The Japanese region of Ibaraki contains more producer sector associations than the American and Korean regions studied here.

Table 4.10 *Relative Strength of Advocacy Associations in Terms of Organizational Resources^a*

	Japan		Korea		United States	
	Civil	Political	Civil	Political	Civil	Political
Capital						
Individual members	No difference	High	High	High ^b	High	High
Paid full-time employees	Low	No difference	No difference	No difference ^b	No difference	No difference
Finance	Low	No difference	No difference	Slightly low ^b	High	No difference
Region ^c						
Individual members	No difference	No difference	No difference	- ^d	High	High
Paid full-time employees	Low	Low	Low	- ^d	Slightly high	No difference
Finance	Low	Low	Low	- ^d	High	No difference

^a"Relative strength" refers to five degrees of difference between survey figures and the average, ranging from "low" (the survey figures are much lower than the average) to "no difference" (the survey figures are close to the average) to "high" (the survey figures are much higher than the average).

^bThe sample size is small.

^cThe sample size of each item in each region is small.

^dThe sample size is zero.

Source: Surveys conducted by Tsujinaka Yutaka and the Japanese Interest Group Survey (JIGS) Group.

debate on the nature of civil society in Japan, whether from the institutional-statist or the social-pluralist viewpoint.

Regarding the size of civil society in terms of state-recognized institutions, my survey found that Japan has half as many nonprofit corporations as the United States (on a per capita basis), but about four times as many as Korea. In terms of their share of all corporations (including for-profit companies), however, Japan's figures are twice those of the United States. There is a large sector of unincorporated "voluntary groups" in Japan, mainly in the advocacy field. In terms of social establishments (permanent places of business with full-time employees), on the other hand, we found a similar density of associations in all three countries. And in terms of active groups, there is no large difference among the countries' local regions. Whatever the expected differences, we can thus conclude that the size of the population of civil society organizations in the three countries was quite similar in the late 1990s.

Despite this similarity in numbers, we found sharp differences in the composition of the associational worlds of these three countries. Japan in particular continues to display a numerical superiority in business associations, which account for approximately 40 percent of all associational establishments (a plurality) and more than 40 percent of all associational income. Although its proportion is smaller among active groups (around 20 percent), even this share is larger than in the United States and Korea. The producer sector in the active group category (which includes business, labor, and agricultural associations) is also the largest in Japan. This developmentalist configuration was confirmed by correlating the history of associational establishments with that of all establishments. Unlike the American pattern, the growth of Japanese associations has been strongly influenced by economic growth.

In determining whether this developmentalism is permanent, trends in the NEC category indicate a transformation since the 1980s. The growth experienced by Japanese civil society organizations during the 1980s and 1990s was due mainly to organizational and financial expansion within the NEC category, which combines civic advocacy, semipublic, and miscellaneous groups. Given the data on years of formation of active groups, there has been a distinct shift in emphasis from the producer sector to the social service sector and finally to the advocacy sector in Japan.

Finally, focusing on the advocacy sector, civic associations demonstrated the most vulnerability, being weaker than the average association in Japan, if not in the United States and Korea. Even so, political associations exhibited average strength in Japan, not unlike the situation in the other two countries.

Japan has undergone waves of democratization that have stimulated civil society organizations, and it was through these waves of democratization that civil society organizations have come to gain greater access and acceptance in the postwar era. Throughout this period, civil society organizations in Japan have carried the imprint of a developmental state (Johnson 1982) in that the producer sector (including industry associations, business groups, and even labor and agricultural associations) has been overrepresented, at least in comparison with the United States, while civic

advocacy groups have been underrepresented and organizationally and financially weak. This imprint has maintained an institutional and sociopolitical structure that includes related legal codes, state agencies, party-political liaisons, and so on, which demonstrate (using neoinstitutionalist terminology) an institutional complementarity and path dependence in postwar Japan's sociopolitical system (Aoki and Okuno 1996: 24-36; Tsujinaka 2002: 334-35).

Nevertheless, supported by the government and business, a mixed sector of civic and semipublic associations began booming in the 1980s and especially in the 1990s. Just as this boom started to face budgetary constraints, the NPO Law was passed in 1998, making it somewhat easier for citizens' advocacy groups to obtain legal status and gain legitimacy. There is additional evidence that NGOs and NPOs may increase significantly in number and resources in the decades ahead to occupy a greater area of the gray zone of nonjudicial organizations in Figure 4.1. By any measure, we can find evidence of increasing pluralization and growing maturity in Japan's civil society, regardless of what happens to its economy.

The pattern of growth of Japan's civil society is distinctive in its gradual transition from developmentalism to pluralistic maturity. In this context, both statist and pluralist models are misleading. While the former focuses too much on the institutional dimension, the latter limits its focus to the surface of emerging bubbles. Because the statist viewpoint overemphasizes the system of public-interest corporations, it cannot grasp the dynamism evident from the perspective of social establishments and active groups. Because the pluralist model overemphasizes the advocacy sector, it cannot comprehend the structural nature of Japan's civil society.

At the turn of the twenty-first century, Japan displays a unique mixture of both tenacious developmentalism and emerging pluralism (Tsujinaka 1997). In examining this turning point in the fourth wave of democratization in modern Japanese history, I predict that pluralism will finally advance one more crucial step thanks to the NPO Law and related structural reforms in public-private relations that should result from today's harsh economic conditions.